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Abstract
1 
Since efforts by industrial countries to increase the amount of foreign aid they 
provide have been on the rise recently, it is important to understand the 
determinants involved. This paper examines the factors affecting support for 
foreign aid among voters in donor countries. The theoretical model, which 
considers an endogenous determination of official and private aid flows, suggests 
that government efficiency is an important factor in this regard, and also ties 
individual income to aid support through the elasticity of substitution. An 
empirical analysis of individual attitudes, based on the World Values Surveys, 
reveals that two factors are positively related to an individual’s willingness to 
support foreign aid: satisfaction with own government performance and 
individual relative income. Furthermore, when using donor country data, we find 
that aid is negatively tied to inequality, corruption and taxes. These results are 
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1. Introduction 
For many developing countries, foreign aid constitutes a significant part—often in excess of 10 
percent or more—of national income (World Bank, 2005a). By contrast, foreign aid represents a 
relatively miniscule portion of the donor countries’ national accounts. Despite the recognition 
that donations to poor countries may serve the rich countries’ interests—either because of 
strategic, economic or humanitarian concerns—and despite many pledges by rich countries’ 
governments to significantly increase their aid amounts, the flows of foreign aid from any given 
country do not typically exceed 1 percent of the national product.
2  
Because of the belief that foreign aid may be essential for maintaining minimal living 
standards in poor countries, providing immediate humanitarian relief, or even spurring 
investment and growth, international agencies, NGOs and other organizations have been 
conducting vigorous campaigns for years to enhance aid flows—with very limited success. It 
appears, therefore, that the relatively small amount of aid provided reflects deeply rooted 
priorities, ideologies or political forces in donor countries. Indeed, Kopczuk, Slemrod and 
Yitzhaki (2003) show that actual levels of foreign aid relative to domestic income transfers 
correspond to the fact that citizens in rich countries attach only 1/2,000 of the weight to the 
welfare of citizens in poor countries  that they do to the welfare of their own poor.  
Additionally, the amount of foreign aid differs significantly across donor countries. For 
example, official development assistance constitutes around 1 percent of GDP in Denmark, 
Sweden and the Netherlands, but only one-tenth of a percent in the United States. The total 
amount of aid (including, in particular, private flows) reaches almost 2 percent of GDP in 
Sweden and the Netherlands, but only one-fourth of a percent in the United States (USAID, 
2004; World Bank, 2005a).  
It is therefore important to have a better understanding of the forces that shape the overall 
levels of aid flows and their differences across the countries. To this end, this paper offers a 
political economy model of international giving, where politically determined amounts of official 
aid interact with private donations.
3 While the weight assigned to foreign aid by the citizens in 
                                                           
2 At recent international forums, donor countries were called upon to increase their aid commitment up to 0.7 
percent of their national income (Roodman, 2004). 
3 In the United States, at least, the argument is often made that whereas the amount of official aid is relatively small, 
private flows more than compensate for this (USAID, 2004). Private flows of aid often constitute a significant aid   5
rich countries obviously plays a crucial role in the analysis (Kopczuk, Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 
2003), we identify additional potentially important elements. One is that the perceived 
inefficiency of the recipient countries’ use of aid, as well as the domestic government’s 
inefficiency, can potentially shape political support for foreign aid. Another element has to do 
with incomes. Though it is generally ambiguous, under empirically plausible assumptions on 
preferences the income effect implies that more affluent individuals should be no less supportive 
of aid—and should likely be more so—than poorer individuals. This also implies that in the 
resulting equilibrium, richer countries are more generous; lower degrees of income inequality 
lead to  more affluent, politically decisive voters and higher levels of political support for more 
generous giving.  
We also consider the case of multiple donors and the free-riding effect, in which there is 
an inverse relationship between the number of donors and the amount of aid provided by an 
individual donor country. One possible limitation of the main analysis is that it ignores the cross-
country variation in tax policies that may affect aid incentives.
4 An extension of the basic 
analysis reveals that the amount of foreign aid is neutral with respect to these provisions, 
implying that any difference in giving across countries is unlikely to be explained by the 
different tax policies.   
The empirical findings strongly support the predictions of the model. The empirical 
analysis of individual attitudes, based on the World Values Surveys, reveals that individual 
income and satisfaction with government performance are positively related to a willingness to 
provide foreign aid. In particular, this implies that more efficient and less corrupt governments 
would be more conducive to public support for foreign aid. Furthermore, an analysis of actual 
foreign aid flows finds that they are linked to domestic institutional quality and income 
inequality, as predicted by the model. 
Earlier theoretical works (Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976; Mosley, 1985 and 
Hatzipanayotou and Michael, 1995) provide valuable insights into the modeling of foreign aid. 
Some of these papers particularly emphasize the public good aspect of foreign aid, as seen from 
the donors’ perspective. The recent paper by Lahiri and Schweinberger (2006) in the political 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
component, about two-thirds of the total aid in the United States, but only around one-fourth in Denmark and 
France.  
4 For example, the tax treatment of donations is different across countries; in the United States and many other 
countries these donations are at least partially tax deductible, and in other countries they are not.   6
economy tradition is closer to the present work. They, too, are interested in the interaction 
between government and private aid. We extend their political economy analysis to the standard 
majority voting framework and incorporate the “warm-glow” motive for giving. More 
importantly, perhaps, we also incorporate factors that were neglected in the literature but which 
nevertheless may have empirical significance, such as the aid inefficiency described above.  
The existing empirical literature on foreign aid has been almost entirely devoted to issues 
of aid allocation and the effects of aid in receiving countries (Alesina and Weder, 2002; Boone, 
1996; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2002 and Easterly, 2003). By considering 
the attitudes toward foreign aid in donor countries, the empirical focus presented here is 
different, but should be viewed as complementary to the existing line of research. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the basic theoretical 
framework, which is then followed by an equilibrium analysis in Section 3. Section 4 focuses on 
the effects of aid inefficiencies, and Section 5 considers the case of multiple donors. Section 6 
extends the main framework to study the potential effects of tax policy. The empirical part 
begins in Section 7 with the description of the data, followed by the data analysis in Section 8. 
Finally, Section 9 concludes. 
2. Basic Framework 
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of individuals, indexed i, whose measure is 
normalized to 1. The individuals differ only in terms of their initial income endowment, yi, 
whose distribution is exogenously given, and are assumed to derive utility from private 
consumption, ci; from the aggregate amount of donated foreign aid, A; and from their private 
donation, zi, which captures the warm-glow motive for giving. In order to avoid the loaded 
discussion of aid effectiveness (Easterly, 2003), the assumption is made that what matters is the 
input (the aid amount) and not the output (poverty reduction, growth or other potentially 
beneficial consequences for poor countries).This modeling approach, which perceives foreign aid 
as a public good, is quite standard (Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976 and Lahiri and 
Schweinberger, 2006). This approach also reflects the idea that, whatever the motivation 
(strategic or humanitarian), foreign aid is often perceived as a national interest (USAID, 2004). 
Thus, individual preferences are: 
U(ci) + V(A) + W(zi)           ( 1 )    7
where  U,  V and W satisfy the standard assumptions and, in particular, are monotonic and 
concave.
5 Income is allocated between consumption and paying taxes to finance the official or 
publicly provided aid as well as private aid donations. We assume that a proportional income tax 
is used to finance official aid and let T, 0 < T < 1, denote the tax rate. Then, normalizing prices to 
unity, the individual budget constraints can be written as: 
yi = ci + Tyi + zi          ( 2 )  
Letting Y denote the aggregate income and Z the aggregate amount of private aid, the 
total amount of donation is: 
A = TY + Z           ( 3 )  
The decision as to the amount of official aid, or alternatively, the tax rate used to finance 
this aid, is made collectively by a majority vote among the individual voters; it is then followed 
by individually made decisions on the allocation of disposable income between consumption and 
private donations of aid. The equilibrium consists of the majority-supported tax rate and 
individual optimal donations, which are mutually consistent. 
3. Analysis 
The analysis proceeds backwards. Suppose first that the tax rate is exogenously given and 
consider the individual allocations of disposable income between consumption and private aid. 
The optimal individual allocation maximizes the utility (1) subject to (2) and (3). The first-order 
condition is: 
-U'(ci) + W'(zi)   =   0           ( 4 )  
whose solution can be written as: 
ci = h(yi(1-T)), zi = yi(1-T) - h(yi(1-T))      (5) 
where 0 < h' < 1 ; so that, integrating across individuals, 
Z = Y(1-T) - ∫ h(yi(1-T) ) d i          ( 6 )  
                                                           
5 The separability assumption, while substantially simplifying the analysis, is not essential. 
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and 
A = TY + Z = TY + Y(1-T) - ∫ h(yi(1-T))di       ( 7 )  
Differentiating, we obtain: 
dA/dT = ∫ h'(yi(1-T)) yi di  >   0         ( 8 )  
This result implies that the crowding out of private donations by official aid is 
incomplete, so that a marginal increase in official aid is not fully offset by a corresponding 
decrease in private aid, thus causing an increase in the overall amount of aid. Suppose now that, 
in anticipation of the private donation equilibrium stated above, individuals vote on the tax rate. 
The preferred tax rate for individual i satisfies the first order condition: 
-U'(ci) yi + V'(A) dA/dT <  0          ( 9 )  
where dA/dT is given by (8), and (9) is strictly negative if T=0. In general, the relationship 
between individual income and foreign aid preferences is complex. To facilitate its 
understanding, suppose that the all sub-utilities are isoelastic functions, so that (1) has the form: 
ci
1-σ/(1-σ) + αA
1-σ/(1-σ)  + βzi
1-σ/(1-σ),  α, β  >   0       ( 1 ' )  
The parameter α reflects the taste for foreign aid as such, whereas β represents the warm 
glow motive from making a donation. When σ > (<) 1, the elasticity of substitution is smaller 
(larger) than unity; σ =1 corresponds to the case of logarithmic preferences. Straightforward 
calculations reveal then that, for a given tax rate, 
ci = β
-1/σ yi(1-T) / (1 + β
-1/σ), zi = yi(1-T) / (1 + β
-1/σ), Z = Y(1-T) / (1 + β
-1/σ), 
A = TY + Y(1-T) / (1 + β
-1/σ)          ( 1 0 )  
The first-order condition for the tax rate (9) in this case takes the form: 
-ci
-σ yi + αA
-σ(Y + dZ/dT) = -ci
-σ yi + αA
-σY(1 - 1/ (1 + β
-1/σ)) = 
-[β
-1/σ yi(1-T) / (1 + β
-1/σ)]
-σ yi + α[TY + Y(1-T) / (1 + β
-1/σ)]
-σY(1 - 1/ (1 + β
-1/σ)) < 0 (11) 
where the second line is obtained by substituting from (10); this condition can be rewritten as 
follows:   9
-(1-T)
-σ (yi/Y)
1-σ + α[T + (1-T) / (1 + β
-1/σ)]
-σ <  0      (12) 
Differentiation of the left-hand side in (12) reveals that the second-order condition holds, 
implying that individual preferences are single-peaked, and that the median voter is decisive in 
determining the political outcome. 
It follows from differentiating (12) that the preferred tax rate increases (decreases) with 
the relative individual income depending on whether the elasticity of substitution is greater (less) 
than unity. Because in any case tax preferences depend monotonically on individual income, in 
the political equilibrium the median income voter is decisive, and the equilibrium condition is: 
-(1-T)
-σ (ym/Y)
1-σ + α[T + (1-T) / (1 + β
-1/σ)]
-σ  <  0      (13) 
where ym is the median income. The ratio ym/Y will be interpreted as being inversely related to 
income inequality (as would be the case, for example, with lognormal income distribution).  
The above analysis bears implications for the resulting amounts of private aid. The 
relative share of private aid out of the total amount of aid is Z/A = 1/[1 + T(1+β
-1/σ)/(1-T)], which 
clearly decreases in T. Since total aid is an increasing function of the tax rate, this implies a 
negative relationship between the amount of total aid and the share of private aid in it. 
In sum, we can formulate Proposition 1: Support for government-provided foreign aid 
increases (decreases) with income depending on whether the elasticity of substitution is greater 
(less) than one. Correspondingly, income inequality reduces political support for official aid 
when the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1; enhances it when the elasticity of substitution 
is less than 1; and is irrelevant in the case of logarithmic preferences. The share of private aid out 
of total is a decreasing function of the tax rate used to provide aid financing. 
Some related research strongly suggests that the elasticity of substitution in many 
applications slightly exceeds 1. Thus in a seminal study, Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) 
estimate the income elasticity of the demand for public good to be around two-thirds and the 
price elasticity to be around one-fourth. This would then imply that richer people are more 
supportive of higher official aid, despite their increased tax obligations, and that income 
inequality enhances its political support. A subsequent micro survey study (Gramlich and 
Rubinfeld, 1982) generally concurs with these results, noting that support for more public 
spending increases with income, but that the relationship is only marginally significant. This   10
leads us to interpret the empirically relevant values of the parameter σ as marginally exceeding 
1. From (10), the aggregate amount of foreign aid then depends positively on the aggregate 
income in the donor economy, and negatively on the degree of its inequality, while the relative 
share of private aid depends positively on income inequality. 
4. Government Inefficiencies 
Inefficiencies in both the donor government and the recipient government may potentially affect 
the donor country’s citizens’ support for providing aid. In particular, one often-articulated reason 
for the limited amount of aid is its inefficient use by recipients. Government corruption, lack of 
accountability and transparency, bureaucratic incompetence—all these may give rise to a 
wasteful allocation of aid from the donor’s perspective, which, in turn, may have an effect on aid 
decisions. Indeed, recipient countries’ inefficiencies have often been cited as reasons to withhold 
aid. 
To study the effect of such inefficiencies on the equilibrium donations, we now suppose 
existence of a wedge between the amount of aid and its effective quantity. The simplest way to 
do this is by assuming that a share (1-ε), of aid does not reach its designed destination (such as 
the poor in recipient countries). In other words, the effective amount of aid, from which the 
donors derive utility, is now: 
A = ε(TY + Z)            ( 3 ' )  
While this assumption does not change the equilibrium in private donations, the 




1-σ [T + (1-T) / (1 + β
-1/σ)]
-σ <  0     (12') 
and differentiation reveals that the preferred (hence, the equilibrium) tax rate decreases, increases 
or remains unchanged as a function of the inefficiency parameter depending on whether σ>1 (<1; 
=1). Inefficiency has both income and substitutions effects. While the latter work to decrease the 
preferred amount of aid, the former work in the opposite direction to increase aid so as to 
compensate for waste.  
Perhaps surprisingly perhaps, the effect of inefficiency on the preferred amount of aid is 
thus generally ambiguous. In the logarithmic case, σ=1, for example, the two factors just cancel   11
each other out. In the empirically plausible case where σ slightly exceeds 1, inefficiency does 
reduce the amount of official aid—hence its total amount—but the reduction is not dramatic. 
This result is consistent with the empirical findings that the amount of aid is not significantly 
correlated with the recipient countries’ degree of corruption (Alesina and Weder, 2002). 
Alternatively, another factor affecting willingness to provide aid is the relative 
inefficiency of an individual’s own government relative to private giving. In the United States, 
for example, there is much skepticism as to how effective the government can be in delivering 
foreign aid, and this is a frequent obstacle to enhancing its amount. Thus, suppose that a dollar of 
government taxes generates a lower amount of aid than private donations. This would imply that 
the aggregate amount of aid can be written as: 
A = γTY + Z, 0 < γ  <   1           ( 3 " )  
One interpretation of such relative inefficiency has to do with productive efficiency, 
whereby the government, because of bureaucratic corruption, rent seeking, etc., is less efficient 
in supplying aid than private donors are. Alternatively, the specification in (3") can also be 
conceived as a reduced form of a model with distortive tax effects, say, in the labor market.
6 
Again, such waste leaves private aid equilibrium unchanged, but individual tax preferences now 
have the following form: 
-[β
-1/σ(1-T) / (1 + β
-1/σ)]
-σ (yi/Y)
1-σ + α[γT + (1-T) / (1 + β
-1/σ)]
-σ(γ - 1/ (1 + β
-1/σ)) < 0 (12") 
In general, the relationship between the government inefficiency parameter γ and the 
preferred tax rate is complex and is mediated by the additional parameters. When the elasticity of 
substitution is close to 1, however, differentiation of (12'') reveals that government inefficiency 
reduces the preferred tax rate, hence aid.  
These results lead to Proposition 2: For empirically plausible values of the elasticity of 
substitution, the amount of aid is not very sensitive with respect to its use efficiency by the 
recipient country; on the other hand, the preferred amount of aid is negatively related to own 
government inefficiency. 
                                                           
6 An analysis of a fully specified model that contains labor-market distortion did not generate any different insights 
and is available from the authors upon request.   12
5. Multiple Donors 
While the basic framework established above focuses on a single donor case, in reality many 
industrialized countries are active donors, sometimes with overlapping interests. For example, 
some cases of humanitarian aid are typically viewed as a public good by multiple potential 
donors, and sometimes there is alignment of donors’ strategic interests, such as in the case for the 
aid to Russia in the 1990s.  
These considerations imply that an extension of the above model to the case of multiple 
donor countries may be realistic. To simplify matters, this section assumes away the warm-glow 
motive, β=0, which implies that there will be no private donations, Z=0. Thus, suppose there are 
K donor countries, indexed k, and that for the sake simplicity the population in each country is 
normalized to measure 1. Letting the subscript ik refer to individual i in country k, a citizens’ 
preferences are represented as follows: 
cik
1-σ/(1-σ) + αA
1-σ/(1-σ)              ( 1 4 )  







           ( 1 5 )  
where Yk is the aggregate income level in country k. The initial distributions of income in each 
country are exogenously given, and the individual budget constraints are as follows: 
yik = cik + Tkyik              ( 1 6 )  
In each country, a majority vote is independently conducted to determine the amount of 
official aid. The equilibrium consists of the majority-supported tax rates for each donor country, 
which are mutually consistent with respect to each other. While countries occasionally try to 
coordinate the amount of giving—such as, for example, the recent attempts within the European 
Union to coordinate foreign aid among individual member countries—most aid-giving is carried 
out independently by the donors. Thus, the non-cooperative view of foreign aid policies seems to 
be an accurate description of the institutional reality.    13
Differentiation of (14) subject to (15) and (16) yields the individually preferred tax level 
in a donor country: 
- yik
1-σ (1-Tk)







-σYk <  0        (17) 
and the second order condition holds. Specification (17) is strictly negative when the preferred 
tax rate is 0. Clearly, given the tax choices in other countries, the tax preference in country k is a 
monotonic function (increasing or decreasing, depending on the elasticity of substitution) of 
income. Let then Tmk(T-k) denote the preferred choice of country k’s median voter for any 
configuration of tax choices in other countries—the best reaction function—and consider the 
vector of taxes satisfying:  
- ymk
1-σ (1- Tmk)







-σYk <  0       (18) 
Because the tax rates belong to the unit interval, and given the concavity of the utility 
function, there exists a unique solution of (18). These tax rates are the preferred choices of the 
majority of each country's population given the tax rates in other countries, and hence constitute 
the equilibrium. It should also be clear that, because of the free-riding problem, this equilibrium 
can be improved upon from the perspective of all countries’ majorities through universal 
marginal aid increases.
7 Moreover, the number of donor countries is detrimental to the amount of 
aid each country is willing to provide. A simple way to see that is by replicating the world 
economy, so that, say, we have K twin donor countries - 2K altogether. From (17), this will 
reduce the preferred tax rate in each country, hence, at equilibrium.   
In sum, we can formulate Proposition 3: Because of free-riding, the aid equilibrium with 
multiple donors generates too little aid from the point of view of the population majorities in the 
donor countries; these majorities could become better of by a marginal increase in aid by all 
countries. Moreover, donations by any giving country decline as the number of donors increases. 
                                                           
7 An especially stark interpretation of this result is obtained in the case of logarithmic preferences, since the 
equilibrium tax rates are then independent of country incomes: see (25) with σ=1. In this case, the equilibrium is 
Pareto inefficient from the donors’ perspective, and, in particular, an improvement is obtained by a universal 
marginal increase in aid.   14
This proposition may explain why, among other things, donor countries have contributed 
relatively generous amounts of aid to former colonies, as has often been noted in the literature 
(Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976). While stronger emotional ties may constitute one important 
explanation, the specificity of the relationship and hence, the absence of additional potential 
donors, might be another factor. It also may explain the relative failure of mobilizing efforts for 
massive humanitarian aid, where many donors’ altruistic interests potentially overlap.   
The Appendix extends the above analysis to the multiple recipients case. It shows in 
particular that free riding is alleviated, and that the donation equilibrium is efficient when each 
recipient country gets aid from only one donor—as may be the case when the donor and its 
group of recipients are linked by specific historical or geographical ties. 
6. An Extension: Tax Policy Effects  
Tax regulations regarding the treatment of private aid donations vary across countries. In the 
United States, such donations are fully tax deductible, whereas in some other donor countries 
such as Sweden they are not deductible at all.
8 Consequently, it is of some importance to study 
the equilibrium effects of tax policies and to assess in their light the robustness of our modeling 
of the tax system. To this end, suppose that private aid is subsidized at the rate of s, and that the 
cost of the subsidy is offset through the tax system. One way of doing this is to interpret T as the 
general tax rate, a part of which, say q, is used to balance the subsidy, whereas the 
complementary part 1-q is used to finance official aid. A balanced budget then implies that: 
qTY = sZ           ( 1 9 )    
The effective amount of official aid is: 
(1-q)TY          ( 2 0 )  
and individual budget constraints are now: 
yi = ci + Tyi + (1-s)zi          ( 2 1 )  
                                                           
8 See Roodman (2004) for a more detailed account of the treatment of foreign aid by the national tax codes. It 
follows from the description there that some kind of tax credit for aid donations is offered by most countries, the 
exceptions being Austria, Finland and Sweden.   15
Larger values of s, hence of q, will be interpreted as more generous tax deductions from 
private aid donations. We are interested in studying how the aggregate amount of aid responds to 
such policies. We will further simplify by considering logarithmic preferences, σ=1.
9 
Taking all policy parameters as given, consider the individual donation choices. These 
maximize the utilities (1') subject to the constraints (19)-(21). Calculations reveal that the 
corresponding equilibrium decisions are given by: 
zi = yi(1-T) / [1-s + (1−s)/β], Z = Y(1-T) / [1-s + (1−s)/β]     (22) 
In particular, the amount of private donations is an increasing function of tax deductions. The 
economy’s budget constraint (19) implies that: 
q = s(1-T)/[T(1-s + (1−s)/β) ]          ( 2 3 )  
The aggregate amount of aid then is: 
A = (1-q)TY + Z = (1-q)TY + qTY / s          ( 2 4 )  
where q is given by (123). Differentiation reveals then that for a given tax rate, the aggregate 
amount of aid remains unchanged under different tax policies.   
These results lead to Proposition 4: The amount of aggregate aid is not affected by tax 
policies. This neutrality result is broadly consistent with the detailed calculations of net foreign 
aid flows in Roodman (2004), which detects only a marginal impact of tax incentives on aid 
donations.  
7. Data 
Empirically, the predictions of the model can be approached from two perspectives: individual 
attitudes with respect to foreign aid in donor countries, and actual aid disbursement. The data 
source for the former is the World Value Survey (WVS), a worldwide survey carried out by the 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) that consists of 
individual cross-national data on a wide variety of topics such as the economy, politics, foreign 
policy and identity, and includes the socio-economic background of individual respondents and 
their attitudes on several topics. The data are derived from face-to-face interviews with people 15 
                                                           
9 Again, as long as σ is not too different from 1, the results go through.   16
years of age and older from more than 81 developed and developing countries. Though our 
empirical work focuses on donor countries only,
10 our interview sample nonetheless consists of 
more than 10,000 individuals who were surveyed in two waves: during 1995-1997 and during 
1999-2000.
11 
Our particular interest focuses on questions regarding people’s opinion of foreign aid and 
its management by the government. Specifically, the key dependent variable comes from the 
following question: “Some people favor, and others are against, having this country provide 
economic aid to poorer countries. Do you think that this country should provide more or less 
economic aid to poorer countries?” Based on the analytical model above, the explanatory 
variables considered include the income decile, income inequality, government efficiency as 
reflected by the degree of corruption, government performance and several others mentioned 
below. Table 1 shows the definitions and questions of the variables employed. All the 
regressions include country fixed effects as well as standard errors adjusted for clustering on 
country.
12  Table 2 provides basic summary statistics of all the variables employed. 
The second data set employed in this paper is from the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (2006) and consists of foreign aid data provided by official agencies 
(including state and local governments) or their executing agencies. In particular, we use the 
series entitled Official Development Assistance (ODA), which is based on the standard 
definition of aid according to the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. It takes into 
account grants and concessional loans net repayment of previous aid loans and treats forgiveness 
of past loans as current aid. In general, it is considered a reasonable measure of actual transfer to 
liquidity-constrained governments. For this variable we have annual data for 22 donor countries 
                                                           
10 We replicated all our empirical tests using the full sample and including a donor country dummy. The results are 
very similar. These findings can be provided upon request.  
11 The sample design and field work were carried out by professional survey organizations, typically members of 
Gallup, but also by national academies of sciences or university-based institutes. Each sample has a multi-stage 
design and random selection of sampling points after stratification by region and degree of urbanization. National 
samples were used in all countries, but some of them were country sub-samples (Russia, Northern Ireland, Chile, 
Puerto Rico, Argentina, India, Nigeria and China). The response rates display great variability, going from 25 
percent in Spain to 95 percent in Slovakia. To correct for the sample design and the response rate, sample weights 
were constructed with specific criteria for each country. We use the most recent wave of this survey—the fourth 
wave—taken between 1999 and 2000, although we are able to enlarge our sample by appending to our data set the 
third wave of the same survey (1995-1997) for the countries that were not included in the fourth wave. 
12 When using country-level variables the application of fixed effects is obviously unnecessary. Also, it is important 
to note that fixed-effects estimates of ordered probits may lead to inconsistent estimates. However, as explained by 
Mayda (2005), this is not an issue with the World Values Surveys data, since they cover many individuals for each 
country.   17
for the period 1973-2002.
13 All the measures of foreign aid used are in 1995 U.S. dollars. In 
particular, we assemble a bilateral relation-level data set, which consists of about 8,000 
observations that provide an account of any bilateral foreign aid relationship between  the 22 
industrial donor countries and other countries in the rest of the world.
14 The definitions of the 
variables employed in this second data set are also shown in Table 1, and summary statistics are 
provided in the lower panel of Table 2.   
8. Hypotheses and Results 
The analytical framework generates several main predictions. For one, it predicts that an 
individual’s income has a positive effect on his/her willingness to enhance foreign aid; therefore, 
a derived result is that income inequality reduces public demand for aid. Also, an increase in 
government-sponsored aid results in an overall larger amount of aid. Additionally, the model 
generates a negative relationship between the own government’s corruption and the willingness 
to disburse aid, while not discerning a negative aid effect of the recipient government’s 
inefficiency. Finally, free-riding incentives imply that with multiple donors, the amount of aid by 
an individual donor country is reduced. 
Our econometric results are designed to test these propositions and are presented in 
Tables 3 and 4 for the individual-level data and in Tables 5 and 6 for the country-level data.   
8.1. Individual-Level Attitudes Data 
While our dependent variable has five categories, we first use a very simple approach by re-
categorizing this variable as a binary variable that responds to the statement: “agree with more 
aid?” This proxy is constructed by assigning a value of 1 to the responses of those who say that 
their country should give either a lot more or somewhat more aid to poorer countries, and a value 
of 0 otherwise.
15 This allows a straightforward interpretation of the coefficients for the probit 
estimates (Mayda, 2005). As can be seen from Table 3, we find that consistent with the 
                                                           
13 Another aid indicator is effective development assistance (Chang et. al., 1998). This measure includes the grant 
element of aid and excludes the loan component of concessional loans, which are made at extremely low interest 
rates, The correlation between official development assistance and effective development assistance is extremely 
high, about 0.94. A third concept of aid is based on country commitments, which reflect firm obligation, expressed 
in writing and backed by the necessary funds, undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assistance to a 
recipient country or a multilateral organization. Commitments are provided by OECD (2006). 
14 The donor countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
15 The response “do not know” is included here. Exclusion of this category does not affect the results.   18
predictions in Proposition 1, agreement with foreign aid is an increasing function of the income 
level proxied by individual income deciles. When including this variable, we obtain positive and 
highly significant coefficients: moving from one income decile to the next increases the 
probability of agreeing with the provision of more foreign aid between 0.8 percent and 1.9 
percent. Furthermore, a positive attitude toward aid is negatively linked with income inequality: 
a 1 percent increase in income inequality decreases the probability of agreeing with giving more 
aid by 2.5 percent.   
Own-government inefficiencies have a bearing on people’s attitude toward development 
aid, consistent with Proposition 2. In all specifications shown in Table 3, we include a donor 
country’s corruption measure generated by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This 
variable yields a positive sign and is significant at 1 percent. (The higher the number, the lower 
the degree of corruption and thus, the better the institutions in the country.) A one-point increase 
in the ICRG index increases the probability of agreeing giving more aid by around 7 to 10 
percent, depending on the specification chosen.
16 Given the importance of this issue from the 
policy perspective, we further explore government efficiency issues by adding relevant 
individual opinion controls. In particular, we include the variables “satisfaction with people in 
office” and “confidence in the government,” in both cases obtaining positive and statistically 
significant coefficients.  
Table 3 also includes tax revenues, treating this variable as a proxy for government's 
involvement in aid. The reason for using this imperfect variable is that the data pertaining to the 
decomposition of aid into official and private sources are very limited.
17 The inclusion of this 
variable yields a positive and statistically significant coefficient in all the specifications. 
Moreover, from the marginal coefficients, we can state that a one-percentage-point increase in 
the tax revenues to gross domestic product increases the probability of providing foreign aid by 9 
percent. Additionally, in order to capture basic macroeconomic conditions we also include the 
rate of the growth in the economy between 1990 and 1995. This variable is also significant and 
positive in all our specifications. Furthermore, we follow some recent work that uses World 
                                                           
16 For the sake of robustness, we also run regressions using the “corruption control index” (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, 2005) instead of the ICRG index and obtain very similar results. The advantage of the ICRG variable is 
that it is available for a relatively long time series, which allow us to use it in our panel specifications and make our 
results comparable. This is not the case with the other data. 
17 We ran panel cross-country regressions with whatever limited data we have been able to collect (World Bank, 
2005b), with the qualitative results being similar to the ones reported here.   19
Value Surveys data and include a specification that considers some basic individual 
characteristics (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Mayda, 2005). We find that more educated people are 
more prone to agree with an increase in foreign aid, whereas age and gender differences are not 
very statistically significant.   
Since the original question from which we created our aid agreement dummy has five 
categories, we also run corresponding ordered probits.
18 Table 4 shows the coefficients for the 
same regressions run in Table 3. Table 4B shows the marginal coefficients after running the 
model with the most complete specification (see the last column in Table 3).
19 The results 
reinforce what we have been stating so far. Notice that, given the fact that we are estimating an 
ordered probit, the signs of the changes in Pr(Yi=1) and Pr(Yi=5) are unambiguous. For instance, 
under the assumption that the coefficients of the regression are positive, the model predicts that 
Pr(Yi=1) must decline and Pr(Yi=5) must increase. Similarly, when the coefficients of the 
regression are negative, the probability of the first category is expected to increase while that of 
the fifth category is expected to decline.
20 
Perhaps the most striking finding about our estimates in Table 4B is the consistency of 
the signs and the statistical significance of most of the regressors along the categories. For 
instance, as expected, the coefficients of income deciles are negative and statistically significant 
for the categories that agree with giving less aid. Also as expected, the categories agreeing with 
more aid are positive and statistically significant. In other words, richer individuals have a higher 
probability of agreeing with giving more aid to poorer countries. On the other hand, the marginal 
effects in the case of income inequality follow the exact opposite pattern, being negative for the 
first two categories and positive for the latter two, which is consistent with the results shown in 
Table 3 and, more importantly, with the predictions of Proposition 1 in the model. 
In the ordered probit regressions in Tables 4A and 4B, we obtain a positive and 
significant coefficient for the ICRG index, meaning that more risky environments in terms of 
government management promote less support for increasing foreign aid. Also, public 
satisfaction with people in the office and trust in the government also increase the probability of 
                                                           
18 A technical appendix available upon request provides further details of this analysis. 
19All the specifications ran show results similar to those found in Tables 5 and 6. To save space, we do not show all 
the marginal coefficient of the ordered probit, but they are available upon request. 
20 In this context, the marginal effects are interpreted as the partial derivatives of the probability with respect to an 
exogenous variable when the variable is not a dummy. On the other hand, when the variable is discrete, we analyze 
the marginal effect on the whole distribution by computing Pr(Yi=j) over the range of β’x with the two extreme 
values of the binary variable. The marginal effect is equal to the difference in these values.   20
agreeing with an increase in foreign aid. Similarly, an increase in the tax revenues yields a higher 
approval for increases in development aid.  
8.2. Actual Foreign Aid Disbursements 
Our results with respect to attitudes toward aid are complemented with actual foreign aid 
disbursement at the country level. As described above, we employ an annual unbalanced panel of 
bilateral relationships for the period 1973-2002. We run a fixed-effects model at the bilateral 
relationship level, controlling for year dummies of the amount of each project in real 1995 
thousands of U.S. dollars against our variables of interest, and the findings are shown in Table 5. 
According to Proposition 1, we should expect a positive sign on gross domestic product and a 
negative sign on the income inequality of the donor country, which is precisely what we obtain. 
Both variables yield coefficient signs that are statistically significant at 1 percent regardless of 
the specification employed. Richer and more egalitarian countries are more likely to provide 
higher amounts of aid than poorer and more unequal societies.
21   
To test for the effects of government inefficiencies, we include the corruption index for 
the recipient as well as for the donor country in the fourth column in Table 5. Here we obtain a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient for the latter and a non-statistically significant 
one for the former. This means that the amount of aid is significantly and negatively affected by 
corruption in the donor country, but is not affected at all by the inefficiencies in the recipient 
country.
22 Analogous to the findings based on attitudes, tax revenues have a positive and highly 
statistically significant coefficient in all specifications. We also test the effects of multiple donors 
on an individual country’s aid giving. In the third column of Table 5, we control for the number 
of donors that each recipient country has in each year for the period under consideration. 
Remarkably, we obtain a negative and statistically significant coefficient, which reinforces the 
idea of free riding in foreign aid donations: as the number of donors increases, the total amount 
of aid given by each country tends to decrease.
23  
Finally, we also employ dynamic panel data techniques (Arellano and Bover, 1995) to 
minimize possible endogeneity problems. By using this method, we estimate a regression 
                                                           
21 An interesting and somewhat puzzling result is the independence found between the recipient’s level of inequality 
and the amount of foreign aid. One may have expected to see larger amounts of foreign aid flowing to more unequal 
countries, but when we include the recipient’s Gini coefficient, as shown in the third column and eight column in 
Table 5, we find no statistical significance at conventional levels. 
22 These results are consistent with previous findings by Alesina and Weder (2002). 
23 See also Knack and Rahman (2004) for similar results.   21
equation in differences and a regression equation in levels simultaneously, with each equation 
using its own specific set of instrumental variables. The consistency of the GMM estimator 
depends on whether lagged values of the explanatory variables are valid instruments in the 
regression. We address this issue by considering two specification tests.
24 The findings, presented 
in Table 6, reinforce the previous results; in fact, there are no substantial differences between 
these results and the ones presented in Table 5. 
9. Conclusions 
Recently industrial countries have been hard pressed to re-consider their foreign aid policies by 
focusing on good policies and good institutions in the recipient countries. While some influential 
research has studied the efficiency of aid disbursement in this regard, no attention has focused on 
the possible determinants of aid-giving in donor countries despite policymakers’ commonplace 
rhetoric on enhancing aid. Given the relatively small amounts of foreign aid flows, it is important 
to understand their determinants. This paper examines the factors affecting the support for 
foreign aid among voters in donor countries.    
The theoretical model, which considers an endogenous determination of official and 
private aid flows, suggests that own government efficiency is an important factor in this regard, 
and also relates individual income to aid support through the elasticity of substitution, which 
implies that income inequality is detrimental to political support for foreign aid. An empirical 
analysis of individual attitudes, based on the World Values Surveys, reveals that satisfaction with 
one’s own government performance and individual income are positively related to a willingness 
to provide foreign aid. Consistent with these results, we find when using donor country data that 
aid is linked to inequality, corruption and taxes in giving countries, but has little connection to 
the economic conditions in the receiving country, particularly income inequality and corruption. 
It is noteworthy—and runs counter to perceived wisdom—that aid generosity is affected mainly 
by own government efficiency and much less by the efficiency of the recipient country’s 
government. Interestingly, we also find that the reticence of countries in providing more aid to 
poor countries has an economic bearing, since countries free ride on the donations of others. 
                                                           
24 A technical appendix contains further explanatory details and is available on request.    22
Table 1. Variable Description 
 
A. Cross-Country Individual-Level World Value Surveys Data 
Do you think that this 
country should provide more 
or less economic aid to 
poorer countries? 
Some people favor, and others are against, having this country provide 
economic aid to poorer countries. Do you think that this country should 
provide more or less economic aid to poorer countries? 1—A lot less 
than we do now; 2—Somewhat less than we do now; 3—About the right 
amount/same; 4—Somewhat more than we do now; 5—A lot more than 
we do now. Source: World Value Surveys (2006). 
Agree with your country 
giving more aid to poorer 
countries 
Variable that takes the value of 1 when people think their country 
should give “a lot more then now” or “somewhat more then they do 
now” with respect to development assistance; and 0 otherwise 
(including those who responded “don't know”). Source: World Value 
Surveys (2006). 
Income deciles  A scale of household income before taxes and other deductions. This 
variable takes values from 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest decile and 10 
the highest. The data are recollected in local currency, scaled and then 
aggregated so the deciles represent a country level income raking. 
Source: World Value Surveys (2006). 
Satisfaction with people in 
office 
How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are 
handling the country’s affairs? Would you say you are 1—Very 
dissatisfied? 2—Fairly dissatisfied? 3—Fairly satisfied? 4—Very 
satisfied? Source: World Value Surveys (2006). 
Confidence in the 
government 
Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the government? 
1—None at all. 2—Not very much. 3—Quite a lot. 4—A great deal. 
Source: World Value Surveys (2006). 
Corruption   Average corruption index from ICRG for 1990-1995. (Range 0 - 6; 6 = 
less risk) 1982 – 1998. Source: ICRG (2006). 
Growth  Average rate of growth of per-capita gross domestic product for the 
period 1990-1995. Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 
2005). 
Gini coefficient  Average Gini coefficient 1991-1995. Source: World Development 
Indicators (World Bank, 2005). 
Tax revenue  Average tax revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product for 
1990-1995. Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 
2005). 
Age  Respondent’s age. Source: World Value Surveys (2006). 
Gender   Gender of the respondent. Male = 1. Source: World Value Surveys 
(2006). 
Educational attainment  What is the highest educational level that you have attained? 1—
Incomplete primary; 2—Complete primary; 3—Incomplete secondary; 
4—Complete secondary; 5—University without degree; 6—university 
with degree. Source: World Value Surveys (2006). 
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B. Panel Regressions Using Country-Level Foreign Aid Data 
Foreign Aid  Defined as Overseas Development Assistance by OECD. In particular, 
we use the log of the amount donated from country j to country i in year 
t, expressed in thousands of PPP real 1995 U.S. dollars. The data is 
available annually for the period 1973-2002. Source: OECD (2006 
Real GDP, donor country  Real GDP Per Capita donor economy expressed in thousands of real 
1995 U.S. dollars. The data is available annually for the period 1973-
2002. Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2005). 
Gini coefficient., donor 
country 
Gini coefficient of the donor economy. The data is available for the 
period 1973-2002. Source: World Development Indicators (World 
Bank, 2005). 
Gini coefficient, recipient 
country 
Gini coefficient of the recipient economy. The data is available for the 
period 1973-2002. Source: World Development Indicators (World 
Bank, 2005). 
Tax revenues, donor country  Tax revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product for donor 
country for the period 1973-2002. Source: World Development 
Indicators (World Bank, 2005). 
Corruption, donor country  Corruption index of the donor country. (Range 0 - 6; 6 = less risk), the 
data is available for the period 1982 – 2002. Source: ICRG (2006). 
Corruption, recipient country  Corruption index of the recipient country. (Range 0 - 6; 6 = less risk), 
the data is available for the period 1982 – 2002. Source: ICRG (2006). 
Number of donors  Number of donor countries from which each recipient country received 
donations in year t. Source: OECD (2006).   24
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
A. Cross-Country Individual-Level World Value Surveys Data 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
This country should provide more or less 
economic aid to poorer countries?  10370  3.34  1.21  1.00  5.00 
Agree with more aid  11070  0.58  0.49  0.00  1.00 
Income decile  8823  5.30  2.70  1.00  10.00 
Gini coefficient  11070  0.34  0.05  0.26  0.41 
Rate of growth  11070  0.07  0.05  0.00  0.18 
Corruption 11070  5.41  0.59  4.40  6.00 
Tax revenues  11070  0.24  0.06  0.17  0.32 
Satisfaction with people in office  10667  2.37  0.78  1.00  4.00 
Confidence in the government  9739  2.25  0.79  1.00  4.00 
Age 11048  44.81  17.05  15.00  97.00 
Gender (Male =1)  11067  0.46  0.50  0.00  1.00 
Educational attainment  10926  3.89  1.35  1.00  6.00 
 
B. Panel Country-Level Foreign Aid Data 
Foreign Aid  8001  14.15  1.15  9.83  16.52 
Real GDP, donor country  8001  25289.79 6147.52  10398.93  44426.11 
Gini coefficient donor country  8001  31.01  5.48  19.60  49.59 
Gini coefficient, recipient country  2262  44.27  9.77  19.30  74.61 
Tax revenues, donor country  7931  28.75  9.05  11.19  44.21 
Corruption, donor country  8001  5.47  0.78  3.00  6.00 
Corruption, recipient country  8001  2.77  1.14  0.00  6.00 
Number of donors  8001  10.67  3.59  1.00  18.00 
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Table 3. Cross-Country Probits: Marginal Effects 
   Agree with your country giving more aid to poorer countries
Income decile  0.019  0.019 0.017 0.008 
  (0.002)***  (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** 
Gini coefficient  -2.518 -2.556  -2.580  -2.868 
  (0.656)***  (0.425)*** (0.281)*** (0.343)*** 
Rate of growth  6.557  6.402 7.387 7.709 
  (1.193)***  (0.802)*** (0.578)*** (0.665)*** 
Corruption  0.106  0.075 0.087 0.076 
  (0.052)** (0.032)**  (0.016)*** (0.014)*** 
Tax revenues    0.939 0.759 0.967 
    (0.260)*** (0.074)*** (0.076)*** 
Satisfaction with people in office     0.066  0.067 
     (0.013)***  (0.013)*** 
Confidence in the government     0.060  0.062 
     (0.016)***  (0.012)*** 
Age       -0.002 
       (0.001)* 
Gender (Male=1)       0.010 
        (0.013) 
Educational attainment       0.041 
       (0.012)*** 
Pseudo  R2  0.07  0.08 0.09 0.10 
Log pseudo likelihood  -5671.34  -5631.47  -4607.15  -4483.22 
Observations  8883  8883 7471 7361 
The dependent variable takes the value of 1 when people think that their country should give “a lot more 
than now” or “somewhat more than they do now” with respect to development assistance; and 0otherwise 
(including those who responded “don’t know”). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering on country. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** 
significant at 1 percent. Because of data limitations in the WVS surveys, the number of observations 
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Table 4A. Cross-Country Ordered Probits 
  
Do you think that this country should provide more or less 
economic aid to poorer countries? 
Income decile  0.039  0.037  0.035  0.015 
 (0.005)***  (0.006)***  (0.006)***  (0.006)** 
Gini coefficient  -4.493  -4.760  -5.586  -6.415 
 (2.089)**  (0.517)***  (0.349)***  (0.522)*** 
9.036 8.795 13.715  14.625  Rate of growth 
(3.403)*** (1.700)***  (0.615)***  (0.872)*** 
0.103 -0.001  0.072  0.046  Corruption  
(0.142) (0.058)  (0.013)***  (0.012)*** 
 3.128  1.842  2.403  Tax revenues 
 (0.729)***  (0.107)***  (0.157)*** 
   0.123  0.125  Satisfaction with people in office 
   (0.035)***  (0.033)*** 
   0.164  0.166  Confidence in the government 
   (0.033)***  (0.024)*** 
Age       -0.003 
       (0.002)* 
Gender (Male =1)        -0.042 
       (0.036) 
Educational attainment        0.114 
       (0.038)*** 
Observations 8297  8297  7061  6958 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on country. * 
Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Because of data limitations 
in the WVS surveys, the number of observations drops when including the variables “satisfaction with 
people in office” and “confidence in the government.”   27
Table 4B. Cross-Country Ordered Probits: Marginal Effects 
 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on country. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; 
 *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Do you think that this country should provide more or less economic aid  
to poorer countries? 




right amount  
Somewhat 
more    A lot more   
Income decile  -0.002   -0.004  0.000    0.003   0.003   
  (0.001) ** (0.001)  ** (0.000)   (0.001)  **  (0.001)  ** 
Gini coefficient  0.873   1.537    0.003   -1.223    -1.191   
  110)  *** (0.128) *** (0.003)    (0.15)  *** (0.051)  *** 
-1.990   -3.504    -0.008    2.788    2.714    Rate of growth 
(0.21) *** (0.268)  *** (0.007)    (0.284)  *** (0.108)  *** 
-0.006   -0.011  0.000    0.009   0.009    Corruption 
(0.001) *** (0.003)  *** (0.000)    (0.003)  *** (0.002)  *** 
-0.327   -0.576    -0.001    0.458    0.446    Tax revenues 
(0.032) *** (0.057)  *** (0.001)    (0.042)  *** (0.038)  *** 
-0.017   -0.030  0.000    0.024   0.023    Satisfaction with people in office 
(0.004) *** (0.009)  *** (0.000)    (0.006)  *** (0.007)  *** 
-0.023   -0.040  0.000    0.032   0.031    Confidence in the government 
(0.004) *** (0.006)  *** (0.000)    (0.004)  *** (0.006)  *** 
Age  0.000   0.001    0.000   -0.001    -0.001   
  (0.000) ** (0.000)    (0.000)   (0.000)  **  (0.000)  * 
Gender  (Male = 1)  -0.006   -0.010  0.000    0.008   0.008   
  (0.005)   (0.008)   (0.000)    (0.007)   (0.006)   
Educational attainment  -0.016   -0.027  0.000    0.022   0.021   
  (0.006) ** (0.008)  *** (0.000)    (0.007)  *** (0.007)  *** 
Observations  577   1,866    440   3,251    824     28
Table 5. Panel Regressions Using Foreign Aid Bilateral Data 
 
   Foreign Aid 
Real GDP, donor country  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Gini coefficient., donor country  -0.0099 -0.0085 -0.0073 -0.0085 -0.0073 -0.0074 
  (0.0020)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0024)*** 
Gini coefficient., recipient country  -0.0003       0.0003 
  (0.0015)       (0.0022) 
Corruption, donor country    0.0757 0.0814 0.0757 0.0814 0.0966 
    (0.0155)*** (0.0173)*** (0.0154)*** (0.0173)*** (0.0292)*** 
Corruption, recipient country    0.0081 0.0091 0.0093 0.0091 0.0352 
    (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0074) (0.0076)  (0.0170)* 
    0.0212   0.0212 0.0169  Tax revenues, donor country 
   (0.0023)***  (0.0023)***  (0.0054)*** 
Number of donor countries      -0.0123 -0.0126 -0.0123 -0.0124 
      (0.0026)*** (0.0026)*** (0.0026)***  (0.0062)** 
Constant  12.7447 11.6664 11.2238 11.7720 11.2238  9.9077 
  (0.1520)*** (0.1050)*** (0.1343)*** (0.1079)*** (0.1343)*** (0.3340)*** 
Observations  3329 8001 7931 8001 7931 2235 
Number of panelid  1066 1370 1366 1370 1366  805 
R-squared  0.35 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.35 
F test  10442.97  183.64 151.95 175.76 151.95  30.60 
Rho  0.93  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95 
Foreign aid data are from OECD (2006). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on country.  
* Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Because of data limitations, the number of observations 
drops drastically when including the Gini coefficient of the recipient country. 
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Table 6. Dynamic Panel Data Regressions Using Foreign Aid Bilateral Data 
 
   Foreign Aid 
Real GDP, donor country  0.0000 0.0001  0.0000  0.0001  0.0002 
  (0.0000) (0.0000)*** (0.0000)  (0.0000)***  (0.0000)*** 
Gini coefficient., donor country  -0.0124 -0.0128  -0.0082  -0.0129  -0.0171 
  (0.0043)*** (0.0018)*** (0.0038)**  (0.0018)***  (0.0049)*** 
Gini coefficient., recipient country        -0.0029 
        (0.0034) 
Corruption, donor country  0.6426 0.2864  0.5893  0.2824  0.3799 
  (0.1518)*** (0.0707)*** (0.1567)***  (0.0715)***  (0.1696)** 
Corruption, recipient country  -0.2964 -0.0032  -0.2737  -0.0077  -0.0136 
  (0.0707)*** (0.0307)  (0.0608)***  (0.0319)  (0.0256) 
Tax revenues, donor country   0.0029    0.0028  0.0020 
   (0.0006)***   (0.0006)***  (0.0005)** 
Number of donor countries     -0.0511  -0.0311  -0.0015 
     (0.0169)***  (0.0080)***  (0.0112)* 
Constant  2.1170 1.1661  1.9532  1.6588  2.4369 
  (0.6279)*** (0.2063)*** (0.7185)***  (0.2772)***  (0.4880)*** 
Observations  3560 3560  3560  3560  1053 
Number of panelid  665 665  665  665  400 
Hansen test of overidentification restrictions  427.73 651.10  402.10  622.58  302.50 
Prob > chi2  0.00 0.76  0.00  0.93  1.00 
Test for AR(1)  -7.38 -9.58  -7.43  -9.77  -3.90 
Test for AR(2)  -1.56 0.21  0.04  0.63  -0.64 
Foreign aid data are from OECD (2006). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on country.        
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Because of data limitations, the number of observations 
drops drastically when including the Gini coefficient of the recipient country. 
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Appendix—Model Extension: Multiple Donors and Multiple Recipients 
Suppose now that there is more than one recipient country, say, r = 1,…,R, and that the donors 
derive utility from the destination of aid, not only from its total amount. Let Akr denote the 
amount of aid flows from donor country k to a recipient country r, and Tkr the tax rate used to 














           ( A 1 )  
The budget constraint facing an individual in a donor country is: 






          ( A 2 )  
To make the analysis of this essentially multidimensional aid allocation problem 
tractable, we assume logarithmic preferences whose structure is somewhat generalized to allow 
for different altruism configurations across the donors, which after substituting (A1) and (A2) 
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α = 1. 
Country k chooses the vector of aid flows to the recipients, or alternatively, it chooses the 
vector of tax rates Tk = (Tk1,…,TkR), and the equilibrium consists of such mutually consistent 
decisions (T1,…,TK).  The logarithmic specification implies that individual citizen preferences 













 < 0,   r = 1,…,R;   k = 1,…,K      (A4)   31
The second order conditions are satisfied implying equilibrium existence. Consider a 
recipient country r and suppose that, at equilibrium, receives aid from at least two sources, say 


























  =   0         ( A 5 b )  
In this case, arguments similar to those used in the main text make clear that, because of 
free riding, the equilibrium amount of aid received by country r is inefficiently low. In contrast, 














κ ) + Yκακr / TkrYk < 0,    κ ≠   k        ( A 6 b )  
Then any reallocation of aid will make at least one donor worse off implying that the equilibrium 
is efficient. This situation is more likely to arise when the donors differ in terms of their national 
income or have different degrees of altruism with regard to the recipients. If, for example, each 
donor country has altruistic preference, hence donates to a different group of recipients—because  
because of a specific relationship such as colonial history or geographic neighborhood—the   
equilibrium is more likely to be efficient.    32
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